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ABSTRACT: This paper assesses America’s recent “pivot” or “rebalance” to the 
Asia-Pacific. It shows that Obama’s pivot represents the beginnings of a strategic 
choice on “selective primacy”—a grand strategy rooted in Washington’s wor-
risome economic and fiscal situation and designed to shape America’s global 
engagement at a time of fiscal austerity, in which primacy in one theatre will 
be achieved through greater selectivity of commitments elsewhere. As a result, 
the US military will increasingly prioritize the air and naval services within 
its force structure, which provides the broader context for more operational 
joint concepts like Air-Sea Battle. Lastly, while triggered by economic and fiscal 
exigencies, I will show that such a strategic shift is primarily directed at China’s 
rise as a regional military power, with particular emphasis on its growing anti-
access and area-denial (A2/AD) capabilities. The paper concludes with some 
thoughts on the future direction of Sino-American strategic competition. 
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Introduction
In the second decade after 9/11, the United States appears to have shift-ed its strategic attention back to the Asia-Pacific. In November 2011, US President Barack Obama spoke to the Australian Parliament and 
announced his intent for the United States to “play a larger and long-term 
role in shaping this region and its future.”2 This speech was only part of 
a wider nine-day tour of the Asia-Pacific, during which time the president 
proved especially forceful in his defence of American exceptionalism and 
veiled criticism of China.3 Secretary of State Hillary Clinton famously 
coined the term “pivot” to describe this re-orientation, which Assistant 
Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Kurt Campbell later 
described as “a fundamental reorientation of American priorities to a place 
where we all understand that the greatest dynamism, the greatest possi-
bilities lie.”4
This paper assesses America’s strategic pivot towards the Asia-Pacific. 
It argues that Obama’s pivot represents the beginnings of a strategic choice 
on “selective primacy”—a grand strategy that combines elements of pri-
macy and selective engagement, emerges from the country’s current eco-
nomic and fiscal malaise, and will likely be magnified in the years ahead. 
The paper then shows how this pivot, now frequently called “rebalancing” 
by administration officials, will impact America’s military force structure; 
one that prioritize air and naval services over ground forces, which pro-
vides the context which provides the context for more operational joint 
concepts like Air-Sea Battle. Lastly, while triggered by economic and fiscal 
exigencies, I will show that such a strategic shift is primarily directed at 
China’s rise as a regional military power, with blue-water naval preten-
sions and an existing fleet designed primarily to contest US access to and 
operations in the Western Pacific theatre. In so doing, the paper provides 
some important clues as to the future direction of Sino-American strategic 
competition and its broader security implications. 
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Obama’s Pivot and the Future of US Grand Strategy 
President Obama’s pivot towards Asia was laid out in a series of carefully 
prepared statements by key members of his administration over several 
months, spearheaded by comments from the president and secretary of state 
in November 2011. It took on greater military sensibility with the Pentagon’s 
release of its Strategic Defense Guidance in January 2012. This document was 
meant to reassess American strategic policy in advance of the spending caps 
mandated by the 2011 Budget Control Act (BCA), which would entail defence 
cuts totaling some $450 billion over the next decade. As the guidance makes 
clear, America’s military “will of necessity rebalance towards the Asia-Pacific 
region.” As a result, the United States will be increasingly reliant on sea 
power, even as it is “no longer…sized to conduct large-scale, prolonged sta-
bility operations.”5 Indeed, according to Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta, 
America will increase its “institutional weight” and enhance its “presence, 
power projection, and deterrence in the Asia-Pacific.”6
There are some early signs the administration is willing to back this 
announcement with some concrete action. For example, the United States 
will deploy 2,500 Marines on a rotational basis with prepositioned equip-
ment at the Darwin naval base in Australia, in what is the military’s “first 
long-term expansion…in the Pacific since the end of the Vietnam War.”7 
Christine Leah has even called this redeployment a strengthening of US ex-
tended deterrence guarantees, which has moved from “implicit declaratory 
assurances” to the more concrete expression of ground troops deployed on 
the territory of its Australian ally.8 Washington has also been negotiating 
for greater access for its warships and fighter jets at Australian air and naval 
facilities.9 Notably, the naval base at Perth is expected to have an increased 
capacity to handle US aircraft carriers, nuclear submarines, and other large 
capital ships.10
The United States is also continuing with plans to upgrade its base fa-
cilities on Guam, turning the island into what the 2010 Quadrennial Defense 
Review (QDR) called a “hub for security activities in the region.”11 To be sure, 
the US military has been boosting its naval and air presence on the island for 
the past decade, with Obama’s more immediate effort largely arising from the 
2006 Roadmap signed under his Republican predecessor, which called for a 
transfer of 8,000 US Marines, their families, and equipment from Okinawa to 
Guam.12 But it is notable that, even in the current fiscal climate, Washington 
still intends to redeploy 4,700 Marines to the island, even as it pushes to keep 
intact the command element and larger expeditionary units in Okinawa and 
rotates the remainder to other locations in the Pacific.13 
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To help reassure its allies in Northeast Asia, the administration moved 
to strengthen “high-level” discussions on extended deterrence with the US-
Republic of Korea Extended Deterrence Policy Committee and the US-Japan 
Extended Deterrence Dialogue. In light of the North Korean threat, height-
ened by its sinking of the South Korean ship Cheonan and artillery attack on 
Teonpyeong Island in 2010, these nuclear consultations helped to reassure 
both allies and carried the possibility of being extended to include “the de-
velopment of common rules of engagement for missile defense systems.”14 
Washington also reiterated that its security treaty guarantees to Tokyo covers 
the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands, following rising Sino-Japanese tensions over 
these disputed islands as well as maritime incidents in the East China Sea, 
with Hillary Clinton even implicitly warning Beijing against “any unilateral 
action that would seek to undermine Japanese administration.”15 At the same 
time, the United States has overseen a process of re-engagement with South 
Korea. For example, Obama accepted a modest increase of the US military 
presence in the Peninsula, after several years of troop withdrawals under his 
predecessor, while also increasing the size of bilateral military exercises and 
signing various defence agreements with Seoul, including one permitting 
increased range for South Korean ballistic missiles.16
In Southeast Asia, the United States recently signed an agreement to 
deploy four new littoral combat ships on a rotational basis in Singapore.17 
Washington has also sought to renew cooperation with other regional 
partners. For example, it signed an agreement with Indonesia in 2010 to 
enhance maritime security cooperation, which provides “a de facto linkage 
between US naval activities in greater maritime Southeast Asia and the US 
Pacific Command’s already extensive relationship with Singapore.”18 The 
US military was also given the assent by the Philippines government to use 
its former facilities at Clark Air Base and Subic Bay Naval Base, leading to 
a growing number of warships and aircraft passing through both bases in 
recent months.19 Defence cooperation also expanded in Indochina, including 
discussions to establish a regional disaster-relief hub and expanded naval 
access in Thailand and joint naval training and exercises with America’s 
former wartime adversary Vietnam.20 
By renewing military ties with key Southeast Asian nations, the United 
States provides an important counter to Beijing’s increasingly aggressive atti-
tude towards the South China Sea, which has given rise to a growing number 
of maritime incidents with Southeast Asian claimants, especially Philippines 
and Vietnam. Many expect such incidents could soon take on a more overtly 
military character, given China’s new naval base on Hainan Island and an 
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interest in securing access through the South China Sea to the open oceans 
beyond.21 In response, at a July 2010 regional security meeting, Secretary of 
State Hillary Clinton even declared American interest in this dispute and 
stressed that any resolution should be accordance to the international law re-
garding exclusive economic zones and continental shelves, which implicitly 
favours claims by Southeast Asian nations.22 Importantly, by strengthening 
its position close to the strategic energy and trade routes that pass through 
the Malacca Straits, the United States also helps establish a linkage between 
the Indian and Pacific Oceans, in what Kurt Campbell has described as “the 
next challenge” in American strategic thinking.23
The United States has also looked further afield to the Indian Ocean for 
strategic partners. Crucial in this regard is the role of India. In its effort to 
cultivate ties with New Delhi, the Obama administration owes a great deal 
to its predecessor, which laid the groundwork for a strategic partnership by 
signing a ten-year defence cooperation agreement and the Indo-US nuclear 
agreement, with the latter amounting to the de facto recognition of India as 
a nuclear weapons state.24 President Obama has expanded this framework 
with a noticeable deepening of diplomatic and military engagements—in 
the continued high-level discussions under the Indo-US Strategic Dialogue, 
the greatly expanded military personnel exchanges and staff talks, and the 
growing number of complex bilateral and multilateral military exercises, 
involving ground, air, and naval forces of both countries (e.g., Malabar, Cope 
India, Yudh Abhyas).25 Naval cooperation has been on the increase in non-
traditional security domains, including anti-piracy and counter-terrorism, 
which has the potential to develop into more high-end missions, “such 
as maritime surveillance, expeditionary operations and anti-submarine 
warfare.”26
Of course, owing to its long-standing preference for strategic autonomy, 
India has displayed a certain wariness over such ties, whether in its reluc-
tance to rely on American weapon systems or refusal to sign a Logistical 
Support Agreement for the reciprocal use of each other’s military facilities.27 
Yet there is also a growing convergence of interest between both countries. 
This is clearly seen on the issue of counter-terrorism. It is also more implicitly 
apparent in their respective concerns over China, with New Delhi becoming 
increasingly alarmed over what many see as Chinese strategic encirclement 
in South Asia, exemplified by China’s military aid and support (including 
nuclear) to Pakistan, expanded military presence along the Sino-Indian bor-
der, and repeated attempts to establish security ties with other South Asian 
nations, irrespective of Indian concerns.28 India’s recent tilt to the United 
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States is an important way to break free of this encirclement. It also comple-
ments New Delhi’s “Look East” policy, which involves naval modernization 
geared towards extra-regional power projection and strengthened security 
ties with the “China-wary nations” of the Western Pacific, such as Japan, 
Singapore, and Australia.29 Indeed, the Obama administration has singled 
out India as a “provider of security in the broader Indian Ocean region,” with 
Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta even calling her a “linchpin” in the pivot, 
in what is increasingly seen as the broader Indo-Pacific region.30
Washington’s effort to find new strategic partners has even led it to 
diplomatically engage Burma/Myanmar, at the beginning of an import-
ant process of liberalization begun by its new quasi-civilian government. 
Indeed, President Obama has not only eased economic sanctions and re-
established diplomatic ties with the new government but became the first 
sitting president to visit the country shortly after his 2012 re-election. Even 
at this early stage, some tentative military-to-military ties have been estab-
lished between the two nations.31 While undoubtedly a means to strengthen 
democratizing forces in the country, there is also little doubt that Obama’s 
engagement is equally about taking advantage of an opportunity to wean 
this former pariah state away from China’s tight embrace, following the lead 
of similar effort by India and the Association of South East Asian Nations 
(ASEAN). Much depends on whether the country’s tentative move towards 
democratization is maintained. But, if pursued, it could represent one of 
the most important foreign policy developments to emerge from Obama’s 
presidency.
So far, much of the pivot complements similar logistical and support 
arrangements made with different Southeast Asian nations following 
American base closures in the Philippines in 1991-1992.32 It is also very much 
in keeping with the 2004 Global Defense Posture Review’s emphasis on smaller, 
flexible, non-permanent “lily-pad” bases.33 The reasons for such a dispersed 
force deployment pattern are clear. Smaller on-shore footprints and access ar-
rangements can ensure a robust American force presence in the region, with-
out the political controversies associated with traditional base infrastructure. 
Christian La Miere also points to two additional benefits of adopting a naval 
“fleet-in-dispersal” strategy in the Western Pacific. With dispersed locations 
further away from the Eurasian landmass, the United States offers China 
some strategic space to help minimize conflict while minimizing the vulner-
ability of US bases to attack.34
Yet President Obama has also not ignored diplomatic engagement. For 
instance, the administration signed the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation 
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with ASEAN in 2009, takes part annually as one of eight dialogue partners in 
the ASEAN Defense Ministers Meeting (ADMM+8) since 2010, and attended 
its first East Asian Summit in 2011. It also expanded its predecessor’s bilateral 
engagement of China with the expansive Strategic and Economic Dialogue 
taking place between Washington and Beijing since 2009. These initiatives 
provide a means to further engage Beijing in multilateral and bilateral 
forums, in what former Secretary of State James Steinberg called “strategic 
reassurance”35—though China’s assertive and often uncooperative attitude, 
whether on climate change or in the territorial disputes with its maritime 
neighbours, quickly dashed some of the initial high expectations that ac-
companied this diplomacy. Importantly, this engagement helps to protect 
Washington from accusations its military presence is meant to provide a 
check on China’s growing strategic assertiveness.36
Obama’s pivot has taken place at an opportune moment, in so far as 
American strategic planners can enjoy some breathing space with the end of 
the Iraq War and the planned exit from Afghanistan. Even then, the occur-
rence of another catastrophic terrorist attack on American soil could rapidly 
change such a calculus—even if such a worst-case scenario is unlikely, if 
not impossible.37 Still, political leaders must contend with the American 
public’s ever increasing expectations for “perfect” security and tendency to 
judge government performance based largely on counter-terrorism failures. 
Both Democrats and Republicans seem destined to compete to convince the 
“public that their party’s programs are different, more comprehensive, and 
more likely to succeed.”38 Domestic measures, closely associated with the 
public’s expectations for homeland security, will likely prove more resistant 
to fundamental change.39 But tactical shifts in the “global war on terrorism” 
(GWOT) are possible, provided that such measures retain their operational 
effectiveness and are seen by the public as being equally comprehensive in 
scope.
Pursuant to this fact, President Obama has eagerly retained GWOT’s 
high tempo and broad scope, as evident by the covert wars and drone at-
tacks that have only expanded under his watch.40 He has also been quick to 
reaffirm that the Pacific pivot does not come at the expense of the Greater 
Middle East, where the United States will continue to place “a premium on 
U.S. and allied military presence,” according to the recent strategic guid-
ance.41 As acknowledged by US Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Jonathan 
Greenert, Washington “won’t be taking their eye off the ball.”42 Even with the 
post-Iraq War drawdown, the United States retains a residual ground pres-
ence in Kuwait and benefits from critical naval and air basing infrastructure 
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in the region.43 Importantly, it has also reinforced the number of mine hunt-
ers in the Persian Gulf and added short-range fire support capabilities for its 
carrier battle groups, in what some call a defensive naval presence aimed at 
“protecting friendly forces and sea lanes” from the Iranian threat to the Strait 
of Hormuz.44 Such a naval “hedge” in the Middle East carries an important 
element of risk, if the US military gets embroiled in a major conventional 
land war, for example.45 But it does complement the strong American naval 
presence in the Asia-Pacific, especially since naval assets can be surged from 
one theatre to another. 
Yet Obama’s pivot raises questions as to its overall financial sustain-
ability, especially when combined with implicit hedging in the Middle East. 
Washington remains mired in economic and financial problems, which 
given the rapid increase in the cost of Social Security, health care and other 
entitlements will likely prove more intractable in the long-term.46 Simply 
put, it is uncertain whether the United States can sustain present level of 
global engagement. This becomes especially true in the event of sequestra-
tion, which would involve an additional $600 billion in automatic defence 
cut over the next ten years. But, irrespective of these cuts, future adminis-
trations will still face the pressing need to rein in discretionary spending 
in order to tackle this burgeoning debt crisis. This will result in increasing 
budget pressure on the Department of Defense (DoD), which accounts for 
over half of discretionary spending and one-fifth of the total federal spend-
ing.47 Some hard decisions will therefore be required on the choice of mil-
itary procurements, capital replacements, and future direction of American 
grand strategy.
By providing clearly articulated set of priorities, Obama has provided 
a useful strategic blueprint on how to deal with any future cuts—namely, 
by keeping the Asia-Pacific as the foremost long-term priority. For example, 
Obama has already announced the withdrawal of up to 10,000 troops from 
Europe, which would put this presence to a post-Cold War low of 70,000. 
Even deeper cuts to its ground forces are certainly possible in this “stra-
tegic backwater.”48 While a drawdown from the Middle East would be 
much riskier, it could also prove necessary. As the Congressional Research 
Service notes, “forces similar to those needed in Asia are also required” in 
the Mideast, including “short- and medium-range missile defense, rotational 
naval deployments and air attack forces, and rapid-reaction ground forces.”49 
Given America’s greatly expanded natural gas and oil production, such an 
option has even become potentially much more feasible. US ground forces in 
Europe and the Mideast would likely bear the brunt of any reductions, but 
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even forward-deployed air and naval assets might not emerge completely 
unscathed. Nevertheless, with significant basing infrastructure still in place, 
assets can still be surged from out-of-theatre in moments of crisis. As difficult 
and risky as this choice may be, the United States has to “think strategically 
as the world’s economic and strategic center of gravity shifts inexorably to-
ward the Pacific,” to borrow the words of Deputy Secretary of State William 
Burns.50
Primacy is unlikely to be totally discarded as a grand strategy option. 
Military superiority simply provides too many benefits to easily forgo. 
Richard Betts has written persuasively on the advantage of primacy for 
counter-terrorism.51 If true with non-state actors, it becomes even truer 
when speaking of near-peer competitors. Strategic preponderance “per-
mits the isolation of the adversary from sources of political and military 
support, further increasing the U.S. margin of superiority and further 
allowing the passage of time to work in favor of the United States.”52 But 
with financial austerity comes the need for greater selectivity in American 
strategic engagements. Primacy would become less broad in scope and 
more selective in choosing where the full weight of US preponderance 
falls. As David Carment and Simon Palamar conclude, America’s “con-
tinued dominance in the Pacific basin” would if necessary come “at a cost 
to power projection elsewhere.”53 Indeed, by being more selective when it 
comes to preponderance, the United States would be able to “perpetuate its 
global primacy” and dominate “the maritime edge of Asia, in an arc from 
the Persian Gulf and Indian Ocean to the South China Sea and northwest 
Pacific.”54 President Obama’s pivot to the Asia-Pacific can be seen as a first 
step in a longer-term trend towards strategic rebalancing—one designed to 
ensure American strategic preponderance in the Asia-Pacific is financially 
sustainable, even if it comes at the expense of commitments to Europe and 
even the Middle East, if necessary. This means the United States has started 
to embrace a grand strategy of “selective primacy,” combining elements of 
selective engagement and primacy; selectivity in terms of its willingness to 
retrench from less strategically vital regions, and primacy that is narrower 
in scope but remains focused on (and equally unyielding to) its most likely 
peer competitor.55 This form of preponderance is similar to what Richard 
Betts has labeled “soft primacy.” As he notes, primacy should be a “cush-
ion” to be exploited “for long-term effect,” which means “staying ahead of 
potential challengers but conserving power for when it is truly needed.”56 
It also represents something more than simply a “tweaking” of America’s 
long-standing “deep engagement” in Europe, the Middle East, and Asia, in 
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so far as this reorientation is much more open to reducing security commit-
ments in some regions in order to retain them in others.57
This newfound prudence is unlikely to satisfy proponents of strategic 
restraint, who advocate military withdrawals from both Europe and Asia, 
withholding security guarantees to key allies, and the reliance of regional 
powers for “offshore balancing” of near-peer competitors.58 Admittedly, by 
preferring sea power over ground forces, administration’s policies do have 
some similarities to this strategically restrained option. But Obama’s pivot 
is precisely about reinforcing alliances and expanding America’s military 
presence in a salient strategic theatre—in other words, sheer preponderance 
rather than “bystanding” or “buck-passing.”59 Increased financial austerity 
could force Obama or his successors to adopt an even more restrained grand 
strategy, but the selectivity of this pivot is precisely meant to safeguard pri-
macy where it matters the most. As such, there is little indication that an 
offshore balancing grand strategy is truly in the offing, notwithstanding 
occasional calls of restraint by realist scholars and right-wing libertarians 
alike.60
Barring either a catastrophic terrorist attack or a crisis that reluctantly 
draws the Americans back to the Mid-East, the United States will likely 
only accelerate this strategic pivot or rebalancing towards the Asia-Pacific 
in the near-term. President Obama’s re-election in 2012, and decision to visit 
Burma, Cambodia, and Thailand shortly thereafter, indicates the Pacific pivot 
will remain a centerpiece into his second term. With this in mind, selective 
primacy looks to be cemented as the dominant strategic option in the years 
ahead. This does not mean that no other alternative strategic option is in the 
offing. The Republicans could continue to advocate a stark, expansive form of 
primacy, much as they did in the last election. Mitt Romney’s vow to reverse 
President Obama’s defence cuts and “restore the sinews of American power” 
did speak to an important and influential segment of the Republican Party 
unlikely to disappear.
Nevertheless, a future Republican administration—or Democrat, for that 
matter—will have to figure a way to pay for such a defence spending increase, 
without either additional revenue or adding to the debt, both of which have 
become increasingly unpalatable for political leaders of both parties. Even 
then, Washington would still need to deal with an increasingly worrisome 
long-term fiscal outlook, which no amount of “efficiencies” in the defence 
budget is likely to mitigate.61 As the Congressional Budget Office outlined, 
only a substantial increase in revenues and decrease in discretionary spend-
ing, including on defence, seem likely to narrowly avert what amounts to a 
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fiscal train wreck.62 For this reason, it would be surprising indeed if addi-
tional spending cuts were not soon on the horizon. Respected commentators, 
including Andrew Krepinevich at the Centre for Strategic and Budgetary 
Assessments and former vice-chairman of the Joint Staff Hoss Cartright, 
acknowledge that major additional defence cuts were highly likely, even if 
sequestration does not take effect.63
US Force Structure, Maritime Strategy, and Air-Sea Battle
Obama’s pivot builds on the strategic policies of his predecessors. The 
Clinton administration maintained American alliance commitments and 
force presence in the Pacific. President George W. Bush oversaw a gradual 
strengthening of this presence. As a result, the United States currently has 
seven of its eleven aircraft carriers and 60 percent of its nuclear attack sub-
marines (SSNs) in the Pacific, alongside eight of its fourteen ballistic missile 
submarines (SSBNs), with two-thirds of all SSBN deterrence patrols taking 
place in that theatre.64 In that sense, the pivot can be construed as “an expan-
sion rather than a transformation of U.S. policy.”65 Yet it also takes place at a 
time of greater fiscal austerity and strategic insolvency.66 President Obama 
only reaffirmed this underlying financial rationale when he said any “budget 
reductions will not come at the expense of that critical region.”67 With se-
lectivity now driven by economic and fiscal concerns, Obama’s pivot has a 
potentially transformational character that will likely only grow if present 
trends continue.
Despite diplomatic effort ostensibly for strategic reassurance, selective 
primacy is primarily meant to ensure American strategic preponderance is 
sustained in the Pacific, making it implicitly directed at the country’s closet 
near-peer competitor. But this grand strategy is equally about matching ap-
propriate means to reach that end. In turn, Obama has shown a willingness 
to countenance not only modesty in grand strategic ends but also greater 
selectivity in military means. It is certainly no accident that the US pivot has 
so far been primarily about cementing partnerships with regional allies and 
expanding access arrangements for US air and naval forces. Simply put, with 
the troop drawdowns from Iraq and Afghanistan, the United States appears 
to have settled on a force structure that prioritizes the US Air Force (USAF) 
and United States Navy (USN).
Selective primacy lends itself to a force structure in which such capital-
intensive services take precedence in the defence budget. Both the USN and 
USAF will face increasing financial difficulty in the pursuit of their respect-
ive fleet-replacement plans, just as air and naval power becomes especially 
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relevant in buttressing the American position in the Asia-Pacific. After all, 
in this quintessentially maritime theatre of operations, “US involvement in 
large-scale land warfare anywhere in East Asia other than Korea is especially 
improbable.”68 Instead, the central challenge is posed by China’s growing 
capacity to contest (if not command) the maritime and aerospace domains of 
the Western Pacific—from the “first island chain” that stretches from Japan’s 
Ryukyu Islands to Taiwan and the Philippines, which encompasses the 
Yellow, East, and South China Seas, and potentially into the “second island 
chain” that goes from Japan’s eastern coast to Guam, Palau and then sur-
rounding the Philippines Sea (see Figure 1). To maintain its “command of the 
commons,” the United States needs to focus on its air and naval assets rather 
than ground forces—with the important exception being the continued 
presence of forward-deployed US Marines, which in any event would rely 
heavily on maritime sealift to reinforce America’s military presence on the 
Korean Peninsula.69
Figure 1: The First and Second Island Chain
Source: United States, Department of Defense, Annual Report to Congress: 
Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China, 2011 
(Office of the Secretary of Defense, May 2011), 23.
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The USN has perhaps the highest chance of emerging with its force 
structure and core capabilities relatively intact, even with recent cuts to 
DOD’s base budget totaling roughly $487 billion from FY2012 to FY2021.70 As 
noted in its 30-year ship-building plan for 2013, the navy expects to deploy a 
fleet of roughly 300 vessels through to 2042, even if this number is expected 
to only be reached by 2017-2018 and will fluctuate thereafter, depending on 
the number of ships procured versus those decommissioned in a particular 
year.71 To be sure, this number is still smaller than the navy’s preferred force 
structure, from the 313 ships in its 2005 Force Structure Assessment to the 328 
ships in last year’s ship-building plan.72 It is also smaller than the 346-ship 
fleet recommended by the Quadrennial Defense Review Independent Panel 
in 2010, which some analysts see as being necessary for the United States to 
retain sea control over the Western Pacific.73 Indeed, even the current plan 
seems to implicitly have the goal of 310-316 vessels, though with expectations 
of a 300-ship fleet inventory—a discrepancy Ronald O’Rourke suggests may 
be due to a forthcoming Force Structure Assessment.74 But this inventory 
would still be an increase from the current fleet size, which sits at 282 ships as 
of March 2012. Importantly, it keeps eleven aircraft carriers in operation until 
2040. Compared to the previous year’s report, it also buttresses the number 
of guided-missile destroyer and SSNs—with relatively stable large surface 
combatant totals over the next three decades, peaking at 90 ships in 2027, and 
attack submarine inventories shrinking only modestly from today’s 55 to a 
low of 43 at the end of the 2020s before rising once again.75
Meanwhile, the USAF appears to have acquiesced to modest force re-
ductions, including the retiring of nearly 300 aircraft and the elimination 
of several squadrons over the next five years alone.76 They will emerge as 
a “smaller but superb force,” one that relies on “multi-role platforms over 
those with more narrowly focused capabilities.”77 Despite cost overruns and 
near-term production delays, the F-35 Lightning II will continue to serve 
as its principal aircraft acquisition, not least due to the fact that alternative 
variants are earmarked for the USN and US Marines. As such, there is little 
in the way of an alternative, even if total procurement numbers may drop 
from the USAF’s projected 1,800. Importantly, the USAF also appears intent 
on protecting another key project—a nuclear-capable, optionally-manned, 
long-range strike bomber, which at an expected per unit cost of $550 million 
is meant to be affordable and procured in significant numbers. In the words 
of David Deptula, this bomber will be “the most advanced UAV in history, 
carrying with it profound implications for U.S. power-projection capabil-
ities.”78 It also corresponds to the USAF’s long-term interest in deploying a 
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family of advanced unmanned systems, which have important advantages 
in terms of capability and cost—thereby representing a potential panacea in 
these times of fiscal austerity.79 
In contrast, both the US Army and Marines, which enjoyed an infusion 
of resources stemming from the Iraq and Afghan Wars, have only limited 
utility under a grand strategy focused on the maritime environment from 
the Persian Gulf to the Western Pacific. The United States simply has little 
interest in repeating the large, costly ground wars of the first decade after 
9/11. Then Secretary of Defense Robert Gates was even blunter: “any future 
defense secretary who advises the president to again send a big American 
land army into Asia or into the Middle East or Africa should ‘have his head 
examined.’”80 As a result, US ground forces will shrink by a total 92,000 
troops over the next five years; essentially a reversal of the troop increases 
of recent years. The Army will be reduced from 562,000 to 490,000, while the 
Marines will shrink from roughly 202,000 to 182,000 troops.81 However, the 
US Marine Corps also has an important maritime element—as a “middle-
weight” expeditionary force, it should be capable of “coming from the sea 
with integrated aviation and logistics capability.”82 Indeed, Secretary of the 
Navy Ray Mabus has reiterated that the Corps will finally be returning to 
their traditional amphibious roots, which will help ensure their continued 
relevance in the Asia-Pacific region.83 It also provides an additional rationale 
for the service to retain key capabilities and platforms in the face of possible 
future defence cuts.
Of course, this does not mean that the USN and USAF are necessarily im-
mune to further reductions. Both services had to settle for procurement caps 
for the F-22 Raptor and the Zumwalt-class destroyer, respectively. Further 
spending limits could further delay full-rate production of the F-35 fighter 
beyond 2017, and perhaps result in a more limited production run, while 
expectations for a new low-cost bomber could prove overly optimistic.84 
Even the existing naval ship-building plan could face significant challen-
ges—if ships are unable to be fully operational for their entire service life or 
if certain vessels prove to be unexpectedly costly. As one critic explains, the 
military could find itself locked into the reduced funding of the near-term 
period into the 2020-30s, when a growing number of large ships will need to 
be retired.85 Indeed, under a “focused economy of force” scenario, a recent 
report envisions a series of even deeper cuts if sequestration comes into ef-
fect, including the restructuring of the F-35 program, which would shrink 
the total number of aircraft procured and eliminate the Marine Corps’s short 
takeoff, vertical landing (STOVL) B variant; a further reduction in destroyers, 
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amphibious ships, and other major surface combatants, which would prove 
difficult to offset in later years; the wholesale elimination of littoral warships; 
and further reductions of Army and Marine Corps personnel to 430,000 and 
150,000, respectively.86
Yet this does not mean that Obama has underfunded the proposed pivot 
towards the Asia-Pacific, or that it will prove short-lived in the face of con-
tinued deficit reductions. As noted earlier, the pivot should be seen as an 
initial shift in America’s “overall strategic capabilities and commitments”87—
a first-order strategic adjustment in which strategic primacy is balanced 
by effort to achieve greater selectivity in both means and ends. Even with 
additional budgetary pressure, the United States could still choose to pri-
oritize capital-intensive over the manpower-intensive services, in the hope 
that shortfalls in the latter could be more easily reversed if circumstances 
so warranted. After all, if “built-in expansibility” is retained, US Army and 
Marine Corps manpower levels can be regenerated relatively quickly, at least 
compared to the USN/USAF’s decades-long procurement process to rebuild 
their respective fleets.88 
In addition, Washington could choose to make do with a reduced fleet 
of warships and aircraft by repositioning naval and air assets away from 
less strategically salient locales. This possibility was recently highlighted 
by US Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta, who says that American naval 
assets will achieve a “60/40 split” between the Pacific and Atlantic by 2020, 
in which “six aircraft carriers…a majority of our cruisers, destroyers, Littoral 
Combat Ships, and submarines” will be in the Pacific.89 With today’s 50/50 
split between both oceans, this change will likely taking place as a result 
of targeted attrition, “with the weight falling in the Atlantic region.”90 This 
might not entail an expansion of the US Pacific Fleet, especially if USN ship 
numbers slightly declines in the years ahead. But it does mean much of the 
core strength of the US Pacific Fleet, particularly the forward deployed US 7th 
Fleet, could be safely retained. 
In fact, such repositioning is also implied by Obama’s gradual relaxation 
on the need to simultaneously prevail in two major regional wars. Emerging 
from the 1993 Bottom-Up Review, this “two-war” requirement represented 
a durable (if under-funded) force-sizing standard over successive defence 
reviews—including even Obama’s 2010 QDR.91 It was only officially retracted 
in the 2012 strategic guidance, which describes a capacity to undertake a 
“large-scale operation” in one theatre, while being able to deny the objectives 
on an adversary in another, in what amounts to a one/one-half war require-
ment.92 The large-scale operation is likely in reference to contingencies in the 
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Western Pacific, whether a maritime operation in the Taiwan Straits or South 
China Sea or a combined-arms operation in Korea. Denial requirements are 
in turn likely aimed at the Middle East, where the threat is no longer conven-
tional “territorial invasion” by Saddam Hussein’s Iraq but rather the threat of 
“irregular warfare and terrorism” from Iran.93 
This one/one-half war requirement was reiterated in the USN’s 30-year 
force-sizing plans, which requires the capacity for “a large-scale naval cam-
paign in one region while denying the objectives of—or imposing unaccept-
able costs on—an opportunistic aggressor in a second region.”94 By focusing 
on these two regions, the USN also begins to resemble what a Centre for 
Naval Analyses report described as a two-hub navy, in which high-end 
combat forces in these two theatres embodied by the US 7th and 5th Fleets 
“would be supported over independent operations…elsewhere” and “surge 
capacity” in the continental United States would be reduced.95 However, if 
continued fiscal austerity limits its envisioned force structure, the USN’s 
plans to undertake large-scale operations in only one theatre would presage 
an even more unbalanced fleet posture—what could eventually become a 
one-hub navy. 
Yet, even as it persistently pushed for more resources, the USN has also 
recognized possible limits to its global capacity relatively early on.96 In the 
mid-2000s, for example, it proposed the creation of the “1000-ship navy,” 
later renamed the Global Maritime Partnership (GMP), which would in-
volve a “fleet-in-being” of allied navies, coast guards, commercial shippers, 
and other departments and agencies to help safeguard the maritime com-
mons. As Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Mike Mullen acknowledges, 
the USN cannot “by itself, preserve the freedom and security of the entire 
maritime domain.”97 While helping to maintain “sea-based globalization” 
and “good order at sea,”98 GMP is also driven by US interest in securing the 
maritime approaches to North America, all the while doing so far from its 
shores as preferred by the USN.99 According to the 2005 National Strategy 
for Maritime Security, by achieving global maritime domain awareness, the 
United States would be better able to identify “threats as early and as distant 
from our shores as possible” and therefore ensure the “layered security” of 
the American homeland.100 Yet, as Chris Rahman also concludes, the GMP 
is “symptomatic of America’s declining ability to protect the international 
system it notionally leads.”101 
The 2007 tri-service Maritime Strategy, Cooperative Strategy for 21st 
Century Seapower, reinforced the importance of GMP and the maritime 
commons. Some criticized the new strategy for its strong “postmodern 
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elements” and failure to mention required force structures or possible ad-
versaries.102 Nevertheless, it explicitly stated the need for “a powerful fleet” 
capable of “selectively controlling the seas, projecting power ashore, and 
protecting friendly forces and civilian populations from attack,” which 
would be “continuously postured in the Western Pacific and the Arabian-
Gulf/Indian Ocean.”103 Indeed, pursuant to this strategy, the administration 
seems to envision safeguarding the navy’s capacity to be positioned in 
these strategically salient theatres. The GMP can also be used to supple-
ment such selectivity, in which “episodic US naval deployments” elsewhere 
can be used as “catalysts for allies and partners to provide day-to-day 
maritime security and building partner maritime capacity.”104 In Naval 
Operations Concept 2010, the USN also goes into greater detail on possible 
challenges to its capacity for sea control and power projection, with an em-
phasis on asymmetrical strategies designed challenge American access to 
the maritime domain.105 The latter refers to the anti-access and area-denial 
(A2/AD) threat, which can include either anti-access missile attacks on for-
ward land bases to deny the US military’s access to a particular theatre or 
area-denial measures to contest and prevent America’s “freedom of action” 
in a delimited area.106 
US defence planners have also not been idle at the prospect of operating 
in such an access-constrained environment. In 2009, the heads of the USN 
and USAF General Norton Schwartz and Admiral Gary Roughead signed a 
classified memorandum to develop the “Air-Sea Battle Concept”—an oper-
ational concept that focuses on “networked, integrated, attack-in-depth to 
disrupt, destroy and defeat” A2/AD networks.107 Given the effort by USN’s 
China Integration Team to apply air-sea battle lessons to a conflict with 
China, much of its urgency seems to stem from developments in the Western 
Pacific.108 Some of Obama’s officials have even obliquely alluded to the 
China-centric nature of this concept, noting that “Air Sea Battle is to China 
what the [USN’s] maritime strategy [of the 1980s] was to the Soviet Union.”109 
Even the name harkens back to the Air-Land Battle Concept developed by 
the US Army and USAF in response to the Soviet’s conventional challenge in 
the late Cold War.110
Air-Sea Battle is meant to guide the USN, USAF, and Marine Corps in 
their effort “to organize, train and equip the current and future force,” by 
achieving “highly integrated and tightly coordinated operations across war-
fighting domains” and providing the “combatant commanders the capabil-
ities needed to gain and maintain access as part of their plans.”111 Crucial to 
the concept is the notion of “Networked, Integrated Attack-in-Depth”—an 
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offensive approach that recommends attacking an adversary’s systems 
“wherever needed” and offensive operations to “deceive or deny adversary 
battle networks” and “neutralize…weapon delivery platforms.”112 As such, 
Air-Sea Battle concept envisions deep strikes into an adversary’s territory 
to destroy both cruise and ballistic missile launchers and enabling systems, 
such as radars, command and control nodes, and other “soft targets.”
Given its classified nature, it is difficult to judge whether Air-Sea Battle 
model can be considered a success. It is at least telling that the USAF re-
cently initiated a supporting study on “Effective Warfighting in Contested 
Environments,” which looks at near-term, cost-effective ways—material, tac-
tics, and training—for the Air Force to operate in a more contested airspace. 
Capabilities being explored include airborne directed-energy weapons, 
cyberwarfare attacks to cripple an adversary’s air defence network, and 
upgraded unmanned vehicles capable of surviving high-threat environ-
ments.113 Also, the Air-Sea Battle Office was stood up in November 2011 
with representatives of all four services, even as USN and USAF teams 
worked with their Army and Marine colleagues to implement 200 initiatives 
designed to achieve the pre-integration envisioned by this concept.114 This 
cross-service concern over A2/AD threats is evident in DoD’s Joint Operational 
Access Concept (JOAC), a draft of which was released in January 2012. JOAC 
makes clear that “cross-domain synergy” across the services is required to 
ensure operational access in a contested environment, with Air-Sea Battle re-
flecting a supporting concept within the broader JOAC rubric.115 Importantly, 
JOAC contains much of the same flavor of the offensively-oriented Air-Sea 
Battle, in so far as it recommends joint forces to “penetrate into the depth of 
an enemy’s antiaccess-area-denial defenses.”116
Anti-Access, Area-Denial, and China’s Naval Challenge
The A2/AD challenge, first formulated by Andrew Krepinevich for the Office 
of Net Assessment in 1992, has been incorporated in a succession of US stra-
tegic policy statements beginning in 1997.117 This trend has persisted to the 
present, with both Obama’s 2010 QDR and the 2012 strategic guidance point-
ing to the need for power projection into access-constrained environments.118 
The administration has also openly reaffirmed what was once only implicit—
that the central states of concern were Iran and China.119 Iran remains primar-
ily a short- and medium-term consideration, largely owing to the possibility 
of US-led military action to forestall its nuclear weapons ambitions.120 In 
contrast, China represents an advanced, full-spectrum A2/AD challenge to 
American sea control over a wide swath of the Western Pacific—one that the 
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US military likely sees as the most formidable challenge to its strategic pri-
macy and maritime superiority since the fall of the Soviet Union. 
The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) generally avoids using A2/AD when 
discussing what Mao Zedong called “active defense,” whereby offensive 
tactics and operations take place under an overall defensive strategy. But ac-
cording to Cortez Cooper, elements of “counter-intervention” can be gleaned 
from PLA’s most authoritative text, The Science of Military Strategy, which 
emphasizes the importance of attacking an enemy’s “center of gravity.” It can 
also be found in joint campaign doctrines, such as the Joint Anti-Air Raid 
Campaign and Joint Firepower Campaign, both of which describe attacking 
an adversary’s forward deployed airbases and aircraft carriers.121 The most 
comprehensive statement of what amounts to A2/AD is perhaps offered in 
what the PLA calls “active strategic counterattacks on exterior lines,” which 
envisions long-range strikes against an adversary’s weak points going as far 
as the “waters between the first and second island chains.”122 
Pursuant to that fact, the PLA’s Navy (PLAN) has been moving away 
from its “near-coast defense” strategy since the 1980s, when civilian and 
military leaders—particularly Deng Xiaoping and Admiral Liu Huaqing—
began propagating “offshore defense” or “near-seas active defense” to help 
justify maritime operations within and slightly beyond the first island chain. 
More recent concepts have even focused on operations into the mid seas and 
beyond.123 The PLA’s Air Force (PLAAF) has also proven eager to depart from 
its traditional task of defending national territory, as shown by its emphasis 
on prompt “combat in depth” and “offensive action as a component of air 
defense” in the 1990s.124 While doctrinal development has been hampered 
by its traditionally close ties to the Army, the PLAAF is now seen as a “stra-
tegic service,” with the responsibility for “offensive counter-air operations” 
capable of suppressing “adversary strikes capabilities at their source.”125
For its anti-access mission, the PLA has created an impressive “strike-re-
connaissance complex,” composed largely of conventionally-armed ballistic 
and cruise missiles, much of which remains in the hands of the PLA’s Second 
Artillery Corps.126 With this arsenal, Beijing can potentially prevent the 
United States from operating out of forward bases from Okinawa to Guam 
and curtail its access to the Taiwan Straits, whether by coercive demonstration 
shots near the adjacent waters of naval bases like at Yokosuka, more direct 
attacks at home-ported carriers, runways, or unsheltered aircraft at air bases 
in Kadena or Guam, or by hitting logistical or command and control nodes 
to inflict operational paralysis.127 Beijing’s capacity for counter-intervention is 
underpinned by what the 2010 DoD report to Congress calls “the most active 
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land-based ballistic and cruise missile program in the world.”128 Others point 
out that China is not only “developing and testing several types of cruise 
and ballistic missiles, but also forming new missile units, converting some 
previously established units to new types of missiles, and training officers…
so that they will be ready to operate the new missiles.”129
Much attention has rightly focused on Beijing’s arsenal of between 1000-
1200 mobile DF-11 and DF-15 short-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs) opposite 
Taiwan, in what Mark Stokes and Ian Easton call the “largest and most lethal 
SRBM force in the world.”130 These SRBMs have ranges between 300 to 600 
kilometers, though the PLA is reportedly developing a longer-range version 
(the DF-16) that can hit targets further afield.131 In addition, China’s new 
solid-fueled, road-mobile DF-21 medium-range ballistic missiles (MRBM), 
which can be conventionally-armed and has a range of over 1,750 kilometers, 
are capable of targeting Japan in its entirety. The PLA already deploys an 
estimated 75-100 DF-21 MRBMs, with future variants potentially being able 
to reach as far as Guam.132 In any event, China already has the capability 
to target Anderson Air Force Base on the island with its existing arsenal of 
15-20 DF-3 and DF-4 intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBMs), which has 
ranges of 3,000 and 5,500 kilometers, respectively.133 
Of course, China’s IRBMs traditionally carry a nuclear payload, which 
would induce some unwanted escalatory pressure if they were ever conven-
tionally armed. Moreover, these legacy systems are due to retire without a 
comparable IRBM replacement. Yet Beijing has moved to strengthen its ar-
senal of land-attack cruise missiles (LACMs). For instance, DoD estimates a 
Chinese arsenal of 200-500 DH-10 second-generation LACMs with a range 
of between 1,500-2000 kilometers. These LACMs have the accuracy to strike 
aircraft shelters and command-and-control facilities, and can hold at risk tar-
gets as far away as Japan and the Philippines (if not for the moment Guam).134 
Perhaps as a substitute for its legacy IRBMs, China also unveiled the new 
long-range H-6K bomber that can be armed with six air-launched cruise mis-
sile (ALCMs). At present, DoD predicts the bomber will be armed with a new 
(albeit unspecified) long-range ALCM.135 This could be a newer version of the 
DH-10 LACM, which will reportedly have both anti-ship and air-launched 
versions soon available—the ALCM version in particular is expected to be 
armed with “conventional high explosives” for stand-off strikes against “U.S. 
bases on Guam.”136
China also acquired the capacity to contest US freedom of action in 
this maritime domain, which is especially strong along its littoral region 
and within the “near seas.” But, when it comes to AD operations, it is the 
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PLAN—supported by the air-to-air and air-to-ship capabilities of the PLAAF 
and PLAN Air Force (PLANAF)—that takes centre stage. China’s navy has 
benefited from two decades of annual, double-digit increases in defence 
spending, now estimated at $120-180 billion.137 However, rather than com-
peting directly with the American fleet, the PLAN has instead opted to use 
its more robust fleet presence and capacity for limited offensive action to 
possibly contest America’s command of the maritime domain. One analyst 
calls this approach a “fleet-in-being” strategy, while Chinese strategists refer 
to the “assassin’s mace,” in which asymmetrical capabilities are “used with 
surprise to attack a vital weakness of the enemy that helps precipitate his 
rapid defeat.”138 As PLAN Rear Admiral Huang Jiang states, AD operations 
might not result in command of the seas but it will ensure command re-
mains in a “contested state, belonging to neither side.” Even then, some of 
the improvements in China’s surface fleet point to the possibility that A2/AD 
systems might be “the precursor to a more capable, lasting Chinese presence 
in Asian waters.”139
China has arguably placed the greatest emphasis on its fleet of subma-
rines. In recent years, the PLAN commissioned a growing number of ad-
vanced diesel-electric submarines (SSKs), with high points being 2004-2006 
with the addition of 17 vessels and 2011-2012 when 9 SSKs were added.140 
These new models also demonstrate significant qualitative improvements 
over aging Ming- and Romeo-class subs. For example, the 12 Kilo-class SSKs 
acquired from Russia are reportedly as quiet as improved versions of the 
Los Angeles-class SSNs and come armed with wire-guided, wake-homing 
torpedoes, and potentially supercavitating ones as well.141 Moreover, eight of 
these subs belong to the especially formidable Project 636M variant, which 
operates the sophisticated Klub weapon-control system for the SS-N-27B 
Sizzler anti-ship cruise missile (ASCM). A supersonic, sea-skimming, 200 
kilometer-range ASCM, the Sizzler could potentially “defeat the U.S. Aegis 
air and missile defense system that is central to the defense of [US] carrier 
strike groups.”142
The PLAN also ramped up its indigenous production of diesel-electric 
SSKs, with 13 Song-class SSKs roughly comparable to a mid-1980s Western 
diesel submarine, at least eight upgraded Yuan-class SSK described as either 
“a Kilo with Chinese characteristics” or a “Song with Russian characteris-
tics,”143 and a new Qing-class SSK that is one-third larger than the Yuan, 
though whether the Qing “is the lead ship of a new class, or a one-of-a-kind 
submarine built for testing purposes” is unknown.144 Moreover, DoD sus-
pects the Yuan benefits from air-independent power [AIP] systems, which 
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can enhance the diesel submarine’s operational range and survivability 
against ASW.145 
To achieve a more balanced undersea fleet, the PLAN has also made 
significant progress on second-generation nuclear-powered SSNs—two 
Shang-class SSNs have been launched, and there are reports of an unnamed 
third-generation SSNs being constructed, with up to five to be added in com-
ing years. Like the Song and Yuan, these SSNs will likely be armed with the 
subsonic YJ-62 ASCM with a 300-kilometer range, though DoD also expects 
all submarines will eventually be armed with a new longer-range ASCM.146 
China has also moved to reinvigorate its sea-based deterrent with the launch 
of the Jin-class SSBN, Many expect a defensive bastion approach in its deploy-
ment pattern, likely to be formed in waters where “the PLA would undertake 
anti-access tactics and operations.”147 With its new naval base on Hainan 
Island, the South China Sea is a strong contender as a possible location for a 
SSBN bastion, which provides an additional context for Beijing recent turn to 
a more aggressive approach in dealing with its expansive sovereignty claims 
there.148
These advanced submarines have a capacity to attack and potentially 
disable either US aircraft carriers or the Aegis ships around them, using 
either wake-homing torpedoes or subsonic/supersonic ASCMs.149 Indeed, all 
of China’s submarines, including the Romeos and Mings, can also be armed 
with a variety of sea mines for blockades and offensive mining operations.150 
Yet, due to their short-range ASCMs, even the SSNs and newer SSKs would 
be vulnerable to American hunter-killer SSNs and other ASW assets. For 
this reason, many suspect the development of a land-based anti-ship bal-
listic missile (ASBM) with a range of up to 1,500, a fact finally confirmed by 
Chinese authorities in 2011.151 Modeled after the DF-21 MRBM, the ASBM 
will be armed with a maneuvering reentry vehicle (MARV) that uses an 
infrared, radar or laser terminal guidance system and reenters at hypersonic 
speed, thereby making it difficult for the US Aegis ballistic missile defences 
(BMDs) to intercept.152 China is also studying the potential for a boost-glide 
(rather than ballistic) trajectory to help ensure BMD penetration, with the 
ancillary benefit of extending the range of the ASBM by up to one-third.153 
While perhaps inspired by America’s MARVed Pershing II missiles of the 
1980s, the ASBM’s capacity to disable or destroy American vessels within 
China’s near seas and perhaps well into the second island chain would offer 
a capability no other country currently possesses.154
Undoubtedly, China is foremost concerned with achieving AD within its 
near seas. At the very least, this would help protect its potential SSBN bas-
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tions, which due to the littoral’s shallow waters would make detection more 
difficult.155 But the PLA also has strong interest in maximizing the geographic 
reach of its AD capabilities. Indeed, given the range of the ASBM, it appears 
likely that China has an “energetic strategy of engaging and defeating the 
adversary directly within the theatre”156—a more expansive AD envelope 
that provides a useful defence-in-depth complement to A2 operations meant 
to prevent the US military’s access to the theatre in the first place. Such an 
ambitious AD approach can also be inferred from both the PLAN’s possible 
incorporation of AIP technology in its Yuans and decision to build a fleet 
of SSNs, which have a much greater operational range than diesel-electric 
submarines. 
Some observers also point to the PLAN’s more conventional efforts to 
build a blue-water fleet, ostensibly meant to protect the “trade- and energy-
choked SLOCs [sea lines of communications] of the Indian Ocean.”157 Indeed, 
China recently unveiled its first aircraft carrier in 2011—a 60,000-tonne, 
Soviet-era Kuznetsov-class carrier renamed Liaoning, capable of holding an 
air wing of 30 or more aircraft and significantly upgraded with new weapon 
systems, including the Dragon Eye phased-array radar and a new point-
defence system. As noted in a recent study, the Liaoning is “more than a train-
ing ship and rather a modestly capable warship,” and will likely be joined 
by additional indigenously-built carriers of similar displacement and type 
(short takeoff but arrested recovery) in the near future.158 
The Liaoning also benefits from a growing fleet of major surface com-
batants, including four Sovremenny-class destroyers acquired from Russia 
and armed with the highly effective supersonic SS-N-22 Sunburn ASCM; 
two Luhu-class and one Luhai-class missile destroyers, discontinued in the 
1990s; four guided missile destroyers (two Louzhou and two Luyang I) com-
missioned in the mid-2000s; and most recently, as many as eight advanced 
Luyang II-class guided missile destroyers, with additional hulls being con-
structed or launched.159 As noted by O’Rourke, by sequentially launching 
different classes of destroyers, China appears to be incrementally testing 
destroyer technology before settling on serial production.160 This appears to 
have commenced with the accelerated production of the Luyang II destroyer. 
But recent reports indicate the simultaneous construction of several even 
more advanced destroyers, the Luyang III, which reveals a newfound con-
fidence in China’s modular shipbuilding techniques and would result in an 
impressive expansion of the PLAN surface fleet.161
The PLAN has also opted to undertake sequential launching of different 
frigate types over the years, with four classes being commissioned in the last 
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two decades alone, including fourteen Jiangwei I and Jiangwei II frigates, 
discontinued in the early 2000s; the short-lived Jiangkai I-class, of which only 
two frigates were launched; and upwards of 16-19 Jiangkai II guided-missile 
frigates many suspect have (and perhaps still is) undergoing serial produc-
tion. To complement these vessels, China has reportedly also launched a new 
type of unnamed corvette or light frigate in 2012, with construction now tak-
ing place across different shipyards in China.162 
Many of these new surface combatants incorporate “advanced design 
concepts such as stealthy superstructures, vertical-launch air-defense sys-
tems…long-range ASCMs, and phased array radars.”163 Compared to the 
PLAN’s earlier ships, the PLAN’s new major surface combatants are larger 
and have better endurance for sustained operations at sea. Indeed, the 
Luyang II benefits from an Aegis-type missile guidance system, complete 
with a multi-dimensional phased-array radar and eight six-cell vertical 
launch systems (VLS) able to hold 48 surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) with a 
range of 90 kilometers. Both the Louzhou and Jiangkei are similarly well-
equipped, the former capable of holding 48 VLS-based SAMs with ranges 
of 120 kilometers and the latter 32 VLS-based SAMs with an 80 kilometer 
range.164 If recent reports prove correct, the 6,000-tonne Luyang III will be 
the PLAN’s most advanced warship, with larger phased array radar and a 
modified VLS-system capable of holding 64 missiles.165
The PLAN’s new major surface combatants should not be seen as a de-
parture from its A2/AD strategy. After all, by providing a formidable area-air 
defence (AAD) capability, these vessels offer an important element of fleet 
protection for surface combatants operating far from shore—and given the 
utility of air-based platforms for ASW, its submarine force as well.166 Yet these 
surface ships are not limited to enabling A2/AD, but also come with advanced 
ASCMs that complement the PLAN’s ASCM-armed SSNs and SSKs. For ex-
ample, the Luyang II is armed with a subsonic ASCM that enjoys a greater 
range than the Sovremenny’s Sunburn missile (280 versus 230 kilometers).167 
Indeed, Vitaliy Pradun has noted the extent to which advanced ASCMs have 
pervaded both the PLAN and PLANAF/PLAAF, including in “four out of 
its five destroyer classes, two out of three frigate classes, five out of seven 
attack submarine classes, and just about every aircraft in its inventory.”168 It 
is also clearly evident with China’s rapid production of a fleet of at least 60 
Hubei-class fast attack catamarans, which can be armed with up to eight YJ-
83 ASCMs to provide a relatively cheap AD capability for its littoral region.169
The PLAN must contend with America’s robust ASW and air superiority 
capabilities, with the latter not only enabling anti-submarine operations but 
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also posing a significant threat to the PLAN’s surface fleet. Yet this advantage 
is clearly dampened in China’s immediate littoral region, where the PLAN 
can count on multiple long-range “double digit” SAMs that can hold at risk 
USAF fighter aircraft and airborne intelligence, surveillance, and reconnais-
sance (ISR) platforms.170 Meanwhile, ground-based interceptors can contest 
US command of the local airspace. Both the PLAAF and the PLAN have a 
growing fleet of fourth-generation multi-role fighter aircraft armed with 
air-launched ASCMs and air-to-air missiles. Many estimate that the total 
number of such “modern” fighters is now roughly 500, which represents an 
almost ten-fold increase from the 50 fourth-generation fighters that existed in 
2000.171 As Richard Fisher concludes, “it is possible to consider that the PLA 
will have close to 1,000 4th, 4+ and 5th generation combat aircraft” by 2020.172 
China is also expanding its number of enabling airborne ISR (intelligence, 
surveillance, and reconnaissance) platforms, including the development of 
the indigenous KJ-2000 AWACS (airborne warning and control system) air-
craft—though the slow development of aerial refueling capabilities will limit 
the exercise of airpower to its immediate environs, and even here questions 
remain as to whether China can coordinate these aircraft and shore-based 
SAMS when both operate in the same airspace.173
China likely envisions saturation attacks with air- and sea-launched 
ASCMs (and the land-based ASBM, once it is fully operational), which 
could potentially overwhelm the Aegis defences of a carrier battle group. 
The PLAN also benefits from a number of shore-based assets, from mobile 
ballistic missiles and ground-launched cruise missiles capable of targeting 
US fixed land bases (and potentially anti-ship attacks with the ASBM) to a 
fleet of fighters that could target land- and sea-based assets and provide a 
protective air defence cover for its naval assets. As such, it now resembles a 
“fortress-fleet…tethered to shore fire support,” which would allow the PLAN 
“to range freely within the waters Beijing deems important without leaving 
the protective cover of shore defenses.”174 The PLAN therefore seems well-
placed to fulfill its objectives for “near-seas active defense” over both Taiwan 
and the South China Sea. The last point should not be dismissed. China has 
reinforced its naval presence on a new base on nearby Hainan Island, which 
can accommodate submarines, surface combatants, and likely the Liaoning 
aircraft carrier. With such a presence, the PLAN will have a much greater 
ability to conduct defensive and offensive operations against other regional 
claimants.175 
Yet Beijing is also interested in expanding its power projection and 
fire support capabilities into the mid seas, as shown by its medium-range 
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ASBM, rapid development of advanced destroyers and frigates with AAD 
capabilities, and effort to master aerial refueling, which would extend the 
range of its shore-based fighters to provide both air cover for the PLAN and 
escort for its long-range ALCM-armed bombers.176 Once carrier aviation is 
mastered, the Liaoning carrier could even provide localized “air and ASW 
protection” for its surface and undersea fleet—a capability that will expand 
when additional carriers are launched.177 Indeed, aircraft carriers could 
form the backbone for what Chinese naval strategists envision as “small 
battle groups” of surface and undersea combatants, under the PLAN’s emer-
ging doctrine of “far-seas active defense.”178 Of course, much depends on 
the future development of Chinese aircraft carriers. Moreover, to be a fully 
blue-water fleet, the PLAN could benefit from additional logistical replen-
ishment ships and larger surface combatants with greater endurance and 
range. Nevertheless, China is at least preparing some of the ground work 
for an eventual blue-water fleet, even as it cements its capability to operate 
along the first island chain
China also has the capacity to more indirectly challenge American con-
ventional military supremacy by disrupting American networks with anti-
satellite (ASAT) weapons and cyber attacks. After all, America’s “targeting 
and battle management networks” are highly dependent on space-based sys-
tems, with even the air-breathing UAVs requiring communication satellites 
to realize their full surveillance potential.179 Such networks can therefore 
be disrupted by ASAT attacks that blind or kinetically destroy space-based 
assets. However, given China’s own growing reliance on space-based assets 
for precision targeting, this would likely entail more selective attacks against 
individual satellites. Indeed, the PLA has already tested such selective ASAT 
capabilities, by illuminating” or “dazzling” a US satellite and destroying an 
inoperative Chinese weather satellite with a direct-ascent kinetic kill ASAT 
in 2007.180 Alternatively, US networks can also be disabled by cyber warfare 
operations ranging from electronic jamming to full-scale “counter-network 
attack,” with many suspecting China has made significant investments to 
buttress its cyberwarfare capabilities.181
Conclusion
With the pivot to the Pacific, the Obama administration has taken an import-
ant step towards a grand strategy of selective primacy—a strategic choice 
driven by current (and likely future) budgetary cuts and underpinned by a 
force structure that privileges naval and air forces and a smaller, amphibious 
Marine Corps. As it is currently conceived, selective primacy also entails 
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a strong emphasis on the need to ensure America’s continued operational 
access to the Western Pacific theatre. Barring a quick solution to America’s 
long-term fiscal problems, this trend will likely continue for the duration of 
Obama’s presidency and even beyond. 
It is important not to overstate China’s A2/AD threat or to underesti-
mate America’s formidable military capabilities that would be brought 
to bear if its ships or bases were attacked.182 China’s counter-intervention 
capabilities would be primarily useful in denying American access and 
operational freedom in this theatre rather than giving Beijing command of 
it. But, in so doing, the PLA’s expansive A2/AD capabilities could still offer 
some important advantages in the conduct of military operations along the 
Chinese coast and within the first island chain, therefore fulfilling Thomas 
Christensen’s prescient adage that China can indeed “pose problems with-
out catching up.”183 It also provides the beginnings of a blue-water presence 
within the second island chain, evident in its more balanced naval fleet 
structure and growing number of major surface combatants. While de-
signed to reinforce and enable A2/AD operations in this region, it could also 
indicate the start of a more ambitious effort eventually achieve a degree of 
sea control in the mid seas.
Yet, as shown by the Air-Sea Battle model and cross-service JOAC, the 
USN and USAF are equally committed to countering China’s A2/AD chal-
lenge. This will have particular implications on whether China might choose 
to back diplomatic assertiveness with military force in the Taiwan Straits and 
South China Seas, and the degree to which the United States would be willing 
to involve itself in such disputes, which explains why one observer envisions 
the near seas and adjacent areas as “an important zone of strategic compe-
tition.” 184 At the very least, given China’s expansive claims of sovereignty 
rights along the littoral, Washington reliance on offshore reconnaissance for 
intelligence on China’s military will likely lead to episodes similar to the 
EP-3 (2001) and USNS Impeccable (2009) incidents.185 Even more uncertain is 
whether such Sino-American competition will be extended further afield to 
the more distant SLOCs that traverse the Malacca Straits to the Indian Ocean 
and beyond—though China’s increasingly competitive dynamic with the 
United States, when combined with similar dynamics with India and Japan, 
does not make one optimistic in the long-term. 
The potential benefits that could be accrued from the Air-Sea Battle 
concept should not be casually dismissed. To overcome China’s full-spec-
trum A2/AD network, both the USAF and USN will likely have to renew 
their operational partnership and develop capabilities in which synergy is 
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cultivated and redundancies minimized, lest they find their tactics and ca-
pabilities a “wasting asset.”186 For example, to protect USAF assets located on 
increasingly vulnerable fixed land bases, the Navy’s Aegis BMD ships could 
provide an important active defence capability against Chinese ballistic mis-
siles. Alternatively, to mitigate the threat posed by ASBMs and sea-launched 
ASCMs to naval assets, the Air Force could initiate “attack-in-depth” oper-
ations—whether using ASAT weapons, electronic countermeasures, or 
stand-off missile strikes—to disable or destroy China’s ground- and space-
based cueing/targeting assets and missile launchers.187
Of course, much depends on the capacity of the USN and USAF to fulfill 
their respective Air-Sea Battle roles and the degree to which future budget 
cuts might affect both services—and indeed whether repositioning towards 
the Pacific successfully offsets any platform shortfalls. The fact that the 
USN’s most recent shipbuilding plan envisions little fundamental change to 
destroyer and submarine inventories is a promising sign. So too is President 
Obama’s prioritization of sea-based BMD. Notably, the United States intends 
to incorporate updated Aegis systems on most of its destroyers and cruisers. 
The BMD-capable fleet armed with advanced Standard Missiles will increase 
from today’s 24 vessels to 36 in 2018, and there is the possibility of its entire 
Aegis fleet becoming BMD-capable.188 In addition, due to its phased/spiral 
development with incremental hardware and software upgrades, America’s 
fleet of Aegis ships will have a steadily increasing capacity to defend against 
ASCMs and other air-breathing threats, irrespective of the speed of BMD 
conversions.189 Many American allies also operate Aegis ships, which could 
be used to supplement US active defence capabilities in certain contingen-
cies, especially if these ships have been upgraded for BMD. For that reason, 
some commentators have proposed a “high end” complement to the GMP in 
the form of an “Aegis BMD Global Enterprise.”190
As part of the pivot to the Pacific, Defense Secretary Panetta also pointed 
to new weapon systems like the new long-range bomber and an unspecified 
ASW aircraft, likely the P-8A Poseidon.191 Such platforms offer long-range 
strike and ASW capabilities to complement the active defences of the grow-
ing Aegis fleet. The USN also plans to add a prompt strike capability by 
modifying SSNs to carry conventionally-armed ballistic missiles.192 This 
development would prove especially useful for the Air-Sea Battle’s concept 
of “attack in depth.” After all, China’s double-digit SAMs pose a particular 
problem for USAF operations, in so far as the air-breathing weapons lack 
the speed to eliminate mobile SAM engagement radars and are reliant on 
airborne surveillance and intelligence platforms highly vulnerable to attack. 
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Contrary to the views of some, even unmanned air combat vehicles operat-
ing from US aircraft carriers might not so easily or successfully “strike back 
at the Chinese mainland.”193 In contrast, submarines can operate relatively 
unfettered in this access-constrained maritime environment, not least due 
to China’s still rudimentary ASW capabilities. If combined with small un-
manned sensor platforms, submarine-launched tactical ballistic missiles 
would have the requisite speed to destroy mobile SAM engagement radars 
and capability to enable follow-on USAF defence suppression operations.194 
Indeed, by destroying shore-based assets like over-the-horizon (OTH) 
radars, the United States could also disrupt the cueing for the PLAN sub-
marine fleet.195
Perhaps more problematic is the multi-service procurement of the F-35. 
Concerns have already been raised as to this aircraft’s affordability, which 
could result in reduced procurement quantities and/or the cancellation of 
a certain aircraft model (e.g., the F-35B for the US Marine Corps).196 Even 
more uncertain is its suitability for operations in more contested airspace. 
For example, the F-35 lacks the weapons load or multi-azimuth stealth fea-
tures required to operate in an anti-access, high-threat environment like the 
Western Pacific, and with its limited range must operate from nearby bases 
and carriers or use aerial refueling assets, both of which are vulnerable 
to PLA attack.197 Unfortunately, there is little in the way of an easy solu-
tion. One possibility is to resume production of the F-22 Raptors, the costs 
of which could be partially offset by lower quantities of F-35s and greater 
reliance on 4.5 generation aircraft for “low-end” challenges. After all, the 
F-22 might have similar range limitations, but it also feature better all-aspect 
stealth, more weapons, and greater speed and maneuverability, making it 
“a much better offensive or defensive counter-air platform than the F-35.”198 
However, these measures might still be insufficient against China’s A2/
AD capabilities. China could conceivably launch cruise and ballistic missile 
saturation attacks to overwhelm US active defences, even if supplemented by 
those of its allies. This could prevent, or at the very least curtail, USAF and 
USN operations in the theatre of operations. The USAF may also be unable to 
achieve regional air superiority over a modernized PLAAF fleet, especially 
along China’s littoral and potentially even within the first island chain. If the 
USN and USAF are capable of an “attack in depth” that cripples the PLA’s A2/
AD network, such an action could prove too provocative and escalatory to 
implement (or be seen as such by Chinese leaders). Simply put, an American 
strike at PLA’s missile launchers, ISR assets, battle management systems 
could be construed as a strategic (albeit conventional) disarming first-strike 
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against its nuclear deterrent—a possibility only heightened by the clear 
“overlap in the types of systems that China deploys for conventional and 
nuclear deterrence.”199 At the very least, an attack on the Chinese mainland 
would represent a geographic widening of the conflict, with all the risk and 
uncertainty that such horizontal escalation entails. 
For these reasons, less provocative measures have been raised. For ex-
ample, the United States could accept constraints on its operational access in 
the Western Pacific, and focus instead on achieving a blockade against China 
around the Malacca and Lombok straits.200 However, despite the potential 
effectiveness of leveraging China’s so-called “Malacca Dilemma,” the United 
States seems unlikely to simply acquiesce to an access-constrained environ-
ment in the Western Pacific. Others call for an intermediate “war at sea” strat-
egy, which would entail sea denial operations within the first island chain 
using hunter-killer SSNs and a flotilla of small missile-carrying ships.201 Yet 
the USN would still find it difficult to track and destroy PLAN submarines, 
especially since ASW air assets might not even be able to operate in the 
contested airspace over littoral. The proposed flotilla is also no panacea, not 
when the PLAN has already established a comparable force of ASCM-armed 
fast attack ships, and indeed an entire naval fleet heavily invested in such 
weaponry
The Joint Operational Access Concept offers perhaps the most cogent piece 
advice in directly challenging China’s A2/AD capabilities. As it acknowledg-
es, the US military will likely suffer “higher casualty levels than joint forces 
have suffered in decades” in a high-threat A2/AD environment, and will need 
to accept “higher levels of calculated risk.”202 As such, even if Air-Sea Battle 
proves conceptually coherent and sufficiently funded, the United States will 
still likely need to develop greater resilience against A2/AD threats. Such 
resilience could be improved by passive defence measures—from the return 
of reinforced armored plating on the hulls of warships, which might be able 
to better withstand ASCM attacks, to the hardening of base infrastructure 
against missile strikes.203 Yet such technical measures, even if implemented, 
should not be seen as a panacea. To ensure selective primacy, the United 
States might simply have to be willing to bear the possible costs of operat-
ing in an A2/AD-constrained environment, in terms of both resources and 
potential casualties.
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